In order to continue enjoying our site, we ask that you confirm your identity as a human. Thank you very much for your cooperation. The name George F. Kennan will forever be equated with the word "containment," the U.S. foreign policy strategy he authored for dealing with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Through numerous writings and career roles—diplomat, historian, adviser, public intellectual, and political scientist among them—Kennan, who passed away in March 2005 at age 101, left a legacy of thought that helps us interpret history and remains relevant to foreign policy thinking today. The Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, which he co-founded in 1974 and named for an ancestor, the elder George Kennan, who also was a Russia scholar, hosted a conference on February 8 to commemorate the many contributions of this influential diplomat and scholar. The Policymaker It was "a reflective analysis of the whole Soviet system," said Jack F. Matlock, who served in the U.S. Foreign Service for 35 years, including as ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987-1991. "Rarely does one idea have such a major resonance …and lasting imprint on American foreign policy," said Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She said Kennan managed to explain Soviet behavior, predict its future policies, and prescribe policy for the United States during such a precarious time. Containment was successful, in that Soviet expansion beyond Eastern Europe was halted. "But we now know it was precisely the Soviet overextension in the Third World, the imperial overstretch, culminating in the war in Afghanistan, that of course hastened the Soviet Union's demise," said Stent. Another reason for the Soviet demise, she said, which Kennan aptly predicted decades before its time, was the internal contradictions of its own economic system. "He considered himself a realist, but I think he was an idealist as well," said Stent. Kennan admired the Russian people's endurance as well as their culture and history but, she said, "He was very critical of cynical, repressive manifestations of Soviet power." Kennan believed U.S. unilateral concessions would only enable Soviet power, she said, while economic aid would not elicit concessions, but instead allow the Soviets to strengthen their military base. Rather, Kennan advocated tough resolve and patience until potential dialogue with Russia might change the status quo peacefully. One of Kennan's lesser known diplomatic achievements, said Matlock, was that he conceived of, and helped design, the Marshall Plan, which helped European nations rebuild after the devastation of World War II and served to increase European economic and political cooperation. His ideas often diverged from his superiors, especially after Dean Acheson replaced George Marshall as secretary of state. Matlock said Kennan's ideas would come to be heavily criticized as Soviet military strength increased and its grip tightened on the countries it occupied. "Kennan was almost always at odds with most foreign policy questions of both administrations, whether Democrats or Republicans," said Matlock. "But those of us in the government who knew the Soviet Union and dealt with its government recognize how profoundly correct much of Kennan's analysis was." By the early 1950s, Kennan left the State Department and spent many years at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, though he was recalled for stints as ambassador in Moscow and ambassador to Yugoslavia. Much of Kennan's analysis was consistent with assumptions the U.S. government made in formulating Soviet policy, particularly those President Reagan came to espouse. Kennan believed military pressure alone could not bring about internal changes in the Soviet Union; instead he believed one must engage one's adversaries. In addition to favoring diplomacy, he also called for reducing armaments and eliminating nuclear weapons. Matlock said, "Officials of the Reagan and first Bush administrations could honestly say that American policy had met the standard Kennan had set. Communism ended in the Soviet Union precisely as George Kennan had predicted almost 60 years earlier—as a result of internal contradictions, not because of pressure from the outside." After the Soviet collapse, said Stent, Kennan supported robust engagement and opposed NATO enlargement on grounds that it might inflame nationalistic, anti-Western tendencies in Russia. Yet he continued to profess that the United States should not interfere in Russia's domestic affairs and should not preach, but influence countries through the force of example. He had written, "this whole tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vain-glorious, and undesirable." The Scholar Kennan authored more than 20 books, most of them relating to Russia. He won the Pulitzer and National Book Award both for his 1956 book, Russia Leaves the War, and for the first of two volumes of his memoirs. The second volume, Sketches from a Life, was published in 1989, the same year he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom. To Kennan, understanding Russia's past was key to understanding its future, and he considered himself a historian, said David Engerman, an associate professor of history at Brandeis University. Although Kennan eloquently wrote books as a historian, said Engerman, praise and criticism for his scholarship was generally cast as commentary on Kennan, the diplomat. Kennan also left a lasting legacy through organizations in which he was involved, including the Kennan Institute, which Engerman called "a vote of confidence in Washington of commitment to a new generation of Russian studies." "Kennan wrote history as it happened," said Allen Lynch, director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Virginia. "His two-volume series on Soviet-U.S. relations survived a generation of revisionist assault and is still regarded as indispensable." After he was removed from official duties, "he had endless pause for reflection on man's fate," said Lynch. "He was in contemporary American civilization, but not of it." While still in it, and of it, Kennan philosophized about the sources of international tension. "We must be gardeners and not mechanics in our approach to world affairs," he wrote, in his 1954 book, Realities of American Foreign Policy. "We must realize that we did not create the forces by which this process operates. We must learn to take these forces for what they are and to induce them to work with us… with understanding and sympathy, not trying to force growth by mechanical means, not tearing the plants up by the roots when they fail to behave as we wish them to…We do not need to insist…that change in the camp of our adversaries can come only by violence." "As a writer, he is remembered for elegance of prose as well as the influence of his ideas, and his books have withstood the test of time," said John Lewis Gaddis, a professor and fellow at Yale University and Kennan's official biographer. Gaddis said Kennan had a special talent for connecting with audiences when he spoke, on such issues as nuclear dangers and environmental concerns. He also preached and practiced philanthropy. Yet, Kennan's diaries reveal the personal side of a self-critical man. "He held himself to standards he felt he never reached," said Gaddis. As we continue to derive meaning and inspiration from Kennan's writings and ideals, we can reflect on this. Kennan once wrote, "Without a generation of civilized people to study history, to preserve its records, to absorb its lessons and relate them to its own problems, history, too, would lose its meaning."
NCSS. D1.1.9-12. Explain how a question reflects an enduring issue in the field. NCSS. D1.2.9-12. Explain points of agreement and disagreement experts have about interpretations and applications of disciplinary concepts and ideas associated with a compelling question. NCSS.D2.His.1.9-12. Evaluate how historical events and developments were shaped by unique circumstances of time and place as well as broader historical contexts. NCSS.D2.His.3.9-12. Use questions generated about individuals and groups to assess how the significance of their actions changes over time and is shaped by the historical context. NCSS.D3.1.9-12. Gather relevant information from multiple sources representing a wide range of views while using the origin, authority, structure, context, and corroborative value of the sources to guide the selection. NCSS.D4.1.9-12. Construct arguments using precise and knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources, while acknowledging counterclaims and evidentiary weaknesses.
Review the lesson plan. Locate and bookmark suggested materials and links from EDSITEment-reviewed websites used in this lesson. Download and print out selected documents and duplicate copies as necessary for student viewing. Alternatively, excerpted versions of these documents are available as part of the downloadable PDF. Download the Text Document for this lesson, available here as a PDF. This file contains excerpted versions of the documents used in the various activities, as well as questions for students to answer. Print out and make an appropriate number of copies of the handouts you plan to use in class. You should also become familiar with the interactive map which accompanies this lesson. This shows the sequence of events in Europe during the early years of the Cold War, as well as their geographic locations. By clicking on the numbered locations pop-ups will appear with more information. This lesson will encompass numbers 8 through 13. Analyzing primary sources If your students lack experience in dealing with primary sources, you might use one or more preliminary exercises to help them develop these skills. The Learning Page at the American Memory Project of the Library of Congress includes a set of such activities. Another useful resource is the Educator Resources of the National Archives, which features a set of Document Analysis Worksheets. Finally, History Matters offers helpful pages on "Making Sense of Documentary Photography" and "Making Sense of Maps" which give helpful advice to teachers in getting their students to use such sources effectively.
In the first activity students will learn what was meant by "containment" by viewing the video below and reading excerpts from two famous documents, the first Clark Clifford's 1946 memo to President Truman and the second a 1947 article by State Department official George Kennan. Both are available in their entirety by way of the EDSITEment-reviewed site of the Truman Presidential Library, but excerpts are included on pages 2-5 of the Text Document that accompanies this lesson. Note that these are challenging documents, even for advanced students, because they deal with Marxist ideology. Teachers are advised to guide their students through them during class rather than assigning them as homework. One method of doing this might be to pick individual students to read a paragraph aloud, and then try to put it in their own words. If students have not completed the previous lesson in this unit—"Sources of Discord, 1945-1946"—they should, by way of introduction, get a brief review of how U.S.-Soviet relations had deteriorated since the end of World War II. A good way of doing this is to have them consult the interactive map and read the text of the popups at locations #1 through 7. Central to both documents is the Marxist idea that capitalism and communism can never peacefully coexist; that, in fact, capitalism is doomed, and that historical forces would ultimately bring about the worldwide triumph of communism. A very readable account of why and how this would happen is "The Manifesto of the Communist Party" by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The above World History Crash Course video on socialism and capitalism offers an insightful analysis of these economic systems. According to both Clifford and Kennan, the belief of the Soviet leadership in the evils of capitalism, and in inevitability of a capitalist collapse, was critical to understanding Soviet behavior. While Stalin and the other leaders of the Soviet Union rejected the idea of long-term cooperation with the capitalist West, and used the ongoing struggle against capitalism as a justification for their repressive policies at home, they still believed that time was on their side. This meant, Kennan believed, that if they were challenged forcefully the Soviets would back off from any aggressive moves rather than risk war. But if they were thwarted enough times, perhaps some kind of change could come from within—in other words, the system might become more willing to accommodate the outside world. As students read these two documents—again, with guidance from the teacher—they should answer the following questions (available in worksheet form on pages 1-2 of the Text Document):
Activity 2. The Truman DoctrineAs mentioned above, the ideas expressed in the Clifford memo and the Kennan article had a profound influence on the Truman administration. Specifically they would help to shape the U.S. response to two crises that emerged early in 1947. This activity will focus on the first of these crises, while the next activity will concentrate on the second. Students should begin this activity by consulting locations #8, 10, and 12 on the interactive map which will give them some background on developments in Greece and Turkey during 1946 and 1947. Next students will read documents pertaining to the so-called "Truman Doctrine," in which the president pledged the country to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Divide the class into two groups; the first will read excerpts from a speech by Truman in which the president makes his case for why the United States should provide aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey. The second group, meanwhile, will read excerpts from a speech by Henry A. Wallace. Wallace—former vice president, Secretary of Agriculture, and Secretary of Commerce—had by this time emerged as the leading left-wing critic of Truman's foreign policy. Both documents are available at Teaching American History; however, excerpts of these documents may be found on pages 5-10 of the Text Document. Students should read the above selections as homework and should be instructed to come to class prepared to discuss the assignment. In class have students pair off so that each member of Group #1 works with a member of Group #2. Their job is to evaluate Truman's proposal through a silent debate. Using the worksheet provided on page 9 of the Text Document, the Group #1 member should begin by writing in the left-hand column a reason why the United States should assist Greece and Turkey. The Group #2 member should then counter by offering a reason why Congress should reject this policy. This should continue until both sides run out of reasons. Teachers should conclude this activity by having a class discussion focusing on how the Truman Doctrine might be considered an example of containment in action. Students should also be asked to give their opinion on whether this was a wise policy. Finally, teachers should direct students' attention to the following critical line from Truman's speech: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This line has important implications for how the United States has conducted its foreign policy ever since. Students should be encouraged to think about what this means, as well as the advantages or disadvantages of following such a guideline. They might also be asked to consider whether Truman intended this guideline to apply to subjugation of any kind, or specifically to communist aggression. Activity 3. The Marshall PlanThe Truman Administration's second effort to implement containment was the Marshall Plan, a vast program of economic aid to Europe in order to rebuild the economies that had been devastated by the war. This, too, had containment of the Soviet Union as its ultimate objective, since it was feared that economic distress would make communism more appealing to ordinary people. Many in the administration believed that poor economic conditions might lead to communist parties taking power in Western Europe through peaceful electoral means. Begin the activity by having students consult once again the interactive map, this time looking at location #11. This will give them some background about the economic conditions Europe faced as a result of the severe winter of 1947. For this activity students will look at several documents and political cartoons related to the Marshall Plan. As in the previous activity, these should be assigned as homework for the night before. Complete versions are located at the sites listed below; excerpts from the first two, however, may be found on pages 10-12 of the Text Document.
Using these documents, students should imagine that the year is 1947 or 1948, and then write a three-paragraph letter to President Truman in which they indicate either their support or their opposition to the Marshall Plan. To wrap up the exercise, teachers should lead a class discussion on the Marshall Plan and how it fit into the strategy of containment. It may be helpful to return to the two documents used in Activity 1, and ask whether the students think that Clifford and Kennan would have approved of the Marshall Plan (they did).
After completing this lesson, students should be able to write brief (1–2 paragraph) essays answering the following questions:
Alternatively, teachers might combine the above into a single larger question: Analyze the policy of containment. What were its strengths and weaknesses? What steps did the Truman Administration take to implement it? A third option would be to ask students to identify and explain the significance of the following:
Aside from specific objections to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the larger strategy of containment had its critics. Probably the most prominent of these was Walter Lippman, who in 1947 was arguably the country's most respected political columnist. It was Lippman, in fact, who coined the term "cold war" to refer to the ongoing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Lippman wrote a series of columns criticizing containment; excerpts from one may be found at Teaching American History. Students might, after reading this essay, be asked to consider whether the predictions Lippman made proved to be correct-and whether this serves as a valid refutation of Kennan's points. In his 1969 memoirs former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote about the origins of the Truman Doctrine; relevant excerpts are available here. Teachers might wish to have their students consider this along with a chronology by Truman speechwriter Joseph Jones outlining the process through which the Truman Doctrine speech was written. This may be found at the site of the Truman Presidential Library. Both of these documents provide insight into American domestic politics at the time, as they suggest that Truman deliberately overstated the Soviet threat in order to rouse a reluctant Republican-led Congress to action. Likewise, teachers may wish to have students explore the background to the Marshall Plan. A large number of documents related to this are available at the Truman Presidential Library; of particular importance are speechwriter Joseph Jones's "Notes on the Economics of Peace" and Truman's September 30, 1947 letter to his wife Bess. Students might be asked to compare and contrast the two, and to consider how a historian might use them. Selected EDSITEment Websites
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What did Kennan predict might happen in the Soviet Union if containment were practiced consistently?
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