Who is responsible for law enforcement

Most people willingly obey most laws, whether a police officer is present or not. They comply with the laws because they consider them fair and because they believe that in the long run it is in their interest to observe them. In small communities in which most citizens know each other, people who live up to the community’s shared ideals are rewarded with the esteem of their fellow citizens. If they break the law or fall short of other people’s expectations, their lives often become more difficult because they are shamed, shunned, or ostracized by the rest of the community and are less likely to receive assistance in times of trouble. In all societies this system of informal rewards and punishments is the most potent aid to law enforcement, but it is strongest in small communities. The forces that order life in a small community thus make the task of the police much easier. Police action is needed only when such informal controls have proved insufficient.

This is why rural and sparsely populated areas are often policed by a single centralized—and often militarized—police force, even in countries that have a decentralized police system. A single police organization operating under a unified command is more cost-effective and more operationally efficient than a bevy of independent small-town police forces. Since the territory to cover may be very large and characterized by difficult terrain, police in such regions must have the long-range mobility and adaptability that are characteristic of military forces. In addition, the countryside has historically been policed by military organizations, as police forces were initially created in urban settings. (The great exceptions to this model are the United Kingdom and the United States, which have long resisted police centralization.)

In larger and more complex societies, informal institutions of social control are generally weaker, and, as a result, formal institutions are generally stronger. The relative weakness of informal controls is attributable to a number of factors. In large societies people often deal with strangers whom they will never meet again, and in such circumstances there may be fewer informal rewards for honesty or fewer informal penalties for dishonesty. Such communities tend also to be more technologically advanced, which leads to the adoption of new laws, such as those regulating the licensing and operation of automobiles and those concerned with commerce conducted on the Internet (see e-commerce). Because some of these new laws may not have the same moral significance as older laws criminalizing violence, theft, or fraud, people may feel less of an obligation to obey them. Moreover, when new laws are created, crime increases almost necessarily. There is thus a danger that people who are convicted of having violated a new law may feel aggrieved and in the future be less willing to cooperate with the police or to obey the law when they are not being observed. Finally, as societies grow, it becomes more difficult for people to place the public interest ahead of their private interests in circumstances where the two may conflict. An employer who catches an employee committing an offense within the workplace, for example, may choose not to notify the police because he fears that the firm’s production, profit, or prestige would suffer if the offense was publicly exposed.

A country’s political culture helps to determine whether its police forces are organized nationally or locally. The desire for efficiency lends itself to the establishment of centralized police forces, which can take advantage of coordination and savings in training, organization, and service delivery. However, such forces face the problem aptly summarized by the Latin question Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (“Who guards the guardians?”). In some democratic countries, particularly the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, citizens have traditionally believed that the existence of a national police force would concentrate too much power in the hands of its directors. They have believed that local communities could not hold a national police force accountable for abuses of power, and they have feared that the national government could use such a police force to keep itself in power illegitimately. For those and other reasons, some democratic countries favour organizing police forces on a local basis. Decentralization brings the police closer to the community, and it often succeeds in tailoring policing to the specific needs of a community. However, a decentralized police apparatus tends to hinder the flow of intelligence between the various components of the system. Another drawback of a system of accountability to local government is that the narrow relationship between the police and their political overseers may facilitate the corruption of both parties.

The need for police accountability is made evident by the great power that police forces wield over the lives, liberties, safety, and rights of citizens. Governments empower police to compel individuals to comply with the law; they allow officers to stop, search, detain, cite, and arrest citizens and to use physical and sometimes deadly force. If police use those powers improperly, they can abuse the civil rights of the very citizens they are supposed to protect. Thus, it is critical that police be accountable for their policies and behaviour. In democratic countries, accountability is ensured mainly by three means. First, police forces are made subordinate to elected representatives (as in the United States, where mayors or state governors oversee the police, and as in Belgium, where a town’s burgomaster is also the chief of police) or to special elected officials (e.g., the police and crime commissioners of England and Wales). Second, the courts are entrusted to safeguard the respect of due process by the police. Third, official bodies are appointed to hear and act upon complaints from citizens against the police.