The U.S.-Soviet alliance during World War II has often been presented in Russia as a paragon of ideal relations between Moscow and Washington: co-equal, realist to the core, and successful. Even during the Cold War it was praised as an example of what the two powerful countries could do if only they were united by a compelling common cause. The idea was later revived after 9/11, then with the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet these hopes are built on a myth from the past and misreading of the present.
Join Stephen Kotkin, the John P. Birkelund '52 Professor in History and International Affairs at Princeton University, Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, to explore these issues and more. To submit a question for the event, please use the YouTube chat or tweet at us @CarnegieRussia. This event is part of the Carnegie Moscow Center and U.S. Embassy in Moscow’s joint project: “Relaunching U.S.-Russia Dialogue on Global Challenges: The Role of the Next Generation”. “This year the world marks 70 years from the beginning of World War II. The United States and [the Soviet Union] were in different situations during that most terrifying war in history, but with the help of the United States … it was possible to stop fascism,” said Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States, at a 15 June 2011 conference cosponsored by the Kennan Institute and the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States. Serhii Plokhii, Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard University, and Author, Yalta: The Price of Peace, spoke on the Yalta Conference. In Plokhii’s words, the conference was not only about the agreements the world media reported on, but also about disagreements, which were caused by “value differences” between the Soviet Union and western powers. For example, Churchill supported spheres of influence for the Soviet Union, but did not agree with the idea of exclusive control of either power over parts of Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, Britain and the United States stood for free elections and democracy in the countries which had come under Soviet rule. The Russian State Archives recently unclassified some documents related to the Lend Lease Act. Elena Tyurina, Director, Russian State Archives of Economics, provided information from the USSR People’s Commissariat of External Trade—particularly, details of the agreements between USSR and United Stated concerning the Lend Lease program. The program was approved by the United States Congress on 11 March 1941, under which the U.S. supplied the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and other allied nations with extensive amounts of war materials, food supplies and other assistance. The U.S and the USSR viewed Lend Lease as mutually beneficial for national security, according to Tyurina. John Haynes, Historian, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, noted the important contribution of the Lend Lease program to the Soviet war effort. Without the United States’ contributions of supplies, Haynes argued that it was unlikely that the USSR would have emerged victorious over Germany. On the contrary, Nikolai Nikiforov, Deputy Director, Military History Institute, Russian Armed Forces General Staff Academy, criticized the approach of some western historians in terms of understanding World War II. Nikiforov argued that the West does not fully recognize the role the USSR played in the victory over fascism, despite the existence of scholarship that supports the role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany; however, they also gave credit to Lend Lease for ensuring victory. “During the first days of the war the USSR lost territories where most of its industrial facilities were based,” noted Victor Gavrilov, Russian Military Institute, adding that the production of war equipment was planned to be moved to the Urals and Siberia, but there was not enough time to execute that plan, Nonetheless, Gavrilov concluded, Lend Lease assistance successfully arrived to the Soviet Union by three routes, despite the danger. By Natalia Jensen
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said, “The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.” In World War II, the three great Allied powers—Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—formed a Grand Alliance that was the key to victory. But the alliance partners did not share common political aims, and did not always agree on how the war should be fought. Churchill and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been working together for some time when the United States entered the war in 1941. Roosevelt believed a British victory over the Axis was in America’s best interests, while Churchill believed such a victory was not possible without American assistance. In 1940, the two leaders worked to find ways for America to help Britain hold on without violating its neutrality. The following year they met off the coast of Newfoundland to begin planning, in sweeping terms, the postwar world. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was a late addition to the Big Three. On New Year’s Day 1942, representatives of all three nations signed the United Nations Declaration, pledging to join hands to defeat the Axis powers. The Big Three faced considerable challenges in coordinating their efforts. Thousands of miles separated their capitals, which meant important decisions often had to be made by telephone or telegraph. Although their representatives met frequently during the war, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill only met twice in person.
Politics and history also made the relationship difficult. Stalin was deeply suspicious, to the point of paranoia, of both Roosevelt and Churchill. He knew his capitalist allies would likely oppose any attempt to expand Soviet influence in eastern Europe when the war ended. Stalin also complained incessantly about the Allied failure to mount a second front in western Europe before June 1944. This front, he said, would reduce pressure on the Soviet Union by forcing Hitler to transfer forces from Russia to meet the Anglo-American invasion. Planning for the postwar era further strained relations between the Allied leaders. By the time the Big Three gathered for the last time at Yalta in February 1945, the Allies were closing in on Germany from both the east and west. Several major questions had to be settled, chief among them the fate of Poland, which was then occupied by Soviet troops that were advancing on Berlin. Stalin demanded that part of Poland be transferred to the Soviet Union and that a Soviet-friendly communist government in the city of Lublin control the remainder of the country. He also insisted that each of the Soviet Union’s satellite republics in eastern Europe receive separate votes in the newly created United Nations, even though these countries were controlled from Moscow. This alarmed Roosevelt and Churchill, but they were powerless to force Stalin to guarantee a democratic and independent Poland. Stalin’s armies already occupied most of the region, and the Western allies could not force them out without fighting the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Roosevelt hoped to have Stalin’s help in finishing off Japan. Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-112542
The Yalta Conference ended in a compromise. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to Stalin’s demands regarding Poland and the United Nations. Stalin, in return, agreed to hold elections in Poland so its people could choose their own government. He also agreed to declare war against Japan shortly after the German surrender.
The end of the war marked the end of the Grand Alliance. Roosevelt died in April 1945 and was succeeded by his vice president, Harry S. Truman, a committed anticommunist. Churchill met briefly with Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, but was replaced halfway through it by a newly elected prime minister, Clement Attlee. Ongoing disputes between the Soviets and the democratic allies about how to organize the postwar world eventually killed the alliance. Stalin continued to expand Soviet influence in eastern Europe, while America and Britain were determined to stop him without provoking another war. This tense standoff between the former allies, which became known as the Cold War, would last for decades.
European Theater of Operations From the Collection to the Classroom
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